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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes recent trends of transnational terrorism in East Africa. It 
assesses the background of domestic and international terrorist attacks in the 
region from 1998 to 2012. The study then quantitatively analyzes regional trends, 
using data drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) showing dramatic 
increases in levels of terrorist violence from terrorist organizations like Al-
Shabaab.    
Based on Al-Shabaab’s propaganda, conventional wisdom suggests that 
the recent increase in transnational terrorism in East Africa is attributable to Al-
Shabaab’s retaliation for countries’ troop contributions to the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In contrast, the analysis presented here is based 
on the hypothesis that a causal relationship exists between large flows of Somali 
refugees and increases in terrorist violence. Evidence shows that Al Shabaab 
operatives disguise themselves as refugees to cross borders and evade 
detection. Refugee populations are used as sources of recruitment and as safe 
havens for planning and executing terrorist attacks, particularly in Kenya.  
Recommendations include: (1) intensification of information operations 
and human intelligence efforts, (2) strengthening of the Joint Counter Terrorism 
Center by establishing strategies for deterrence and disruption of transnational 
terror networks, and (3) coordination of regional actions for countering terrorist 
threats attributed to Somali refugee communities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a long history of terrorist violence within East African countries, 
particularly in Kenya and Uganda. For instance, as early as 1980, the Norfolk 
Hotel in Nairobi was bombed, leaving 15 people dead. Nzes (2012) recalls that 
“an Arab group claimed responsibility for the bombing, saying it was a revenge 
for Kenya allowing Israeli troops to refuel in Nairobi during the raid on Uganda’s 
Entebbe Airport in 1976.” However, in the recent past, we have witnessed 
substantial changes in terrorist activities across the region. In particular, 
according to quantitative data derived from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), it is evident that international terrorism has increased significantly in 
Kenya in recent years, far more so than it has in other East African countries. 
The epicenter of this thesis therefore focuses on an analysis and explanation of 
Kenya’s terrorism over the period from 1998 to 2012.  
East Africa’s terrorism trend for the period from 1998 to 2012 shows that 
from 1998 to 2009, Kenya experienced relatively low levels of terrorism 
compared to the rest of the region, and generally registered more domestic 
terrorist attacks than international attacks. In contrast, between 2010 and 2012, 
Kenya experienced far higher levels of terrorism than the other countries in the 
region, and most of the attacks were launched by transnational groups. As a 
result, out of the 176 total attacks that Kenya experienced between 1998 and 
2012, 155 (88.1 percent) were international rather than domestic in origin. 
Therefore, the main puzzle for this research is why Kenya experienced such a 
rapid increase in international terrorist attacks since 2010, while other countries 
have registered comparably fewer attacks in the same time period. Although this 
study focuses on Kenya, analysis of the findings will be strategically resourceful 
and applicable to other countries. Figure 1 shows the regional terrorism trend, 
and Figure 2 shows the trend between domestic and international terrorist 
attacks in Kenya. (Data for Figures 1 and 2 were derived from the GTD and 
constructed qualitatively using R-Studio.) 
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Figure 1.  Terrorist Attacks in East Africa, 1998 to 2012 (from GTD, 
2012).  
 
Figure 2.  Domestic and International Terrorism in Kenya, 1998 to 2012 
(from GTD, 2012). 
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A. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
Various theories may be associated with the huge spike in the number of 
terrorist attacks in Kenya. For instance, several media reports have consistently 
propagated negative propaganda from Somalia’s Islamist militant group, Al 
Shabaab, suggesting that countries contributing troops to the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to fight the group are more vulnerable to 
transnational terrorist attacks orchestrated by that very group in retaliation for 
these countries’ military involvement in Somalia. Allison (2013, p. 1) reports that  
unlike Uganda’s internationally approved military support for 
Somalia’s fragile central government (along with Burundi, Djibouti, 
and Sierra Leone), Kenya’s was a unilateral intervention. Despite 
subsequent UN legitimacy, Kenya’s intervention in Somalia was 
essentially an invasion, and the risk of revenge was always going to 
be high.  
Although the propaganda argument sounds outwardly convincing, it may 
not be wholly true. It is worth noting that ever since AMISOM’s inception in 2007, 
Burundi and Uganda have contributed more troops than Kenya, and are widely 
perceived by Al Shabaab as invaders, yet they experienced fewer attacks over 
the same period. Table 1 shows AMISOM military strength as of January 2014. 
 





Sierra Leone 850 
Uganda 6,223 
Force Headquarters 81 
Total 21,645 
Table 1.   AMISOM Military Strength as of January 2014 (from 
AMISOM website, 2014). 
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This study will specifically analyze and explain Kenya’s high level of 
international terrorism with particular reference to the influx of Somali refugees 
and the existence of a strong Somali business and local community. The author 
hypothesizes that the Islamist militant group Al Shabaab has taken advantage of 
refugees to establish, plan, and operationalize terrorist cells for attacking high 
value targets, mainly in Kenya and Uganda. Similarly, the United States’ Country 
Reports on Terrorism (2011, p. 16) note that “arms smuggling, reports of 
extremist recruiting within refugee camps and Kenyan cities, and increased 
allegations of terrorist plotting, have enhanced recognition among government 
officials and civil society that Kenya has remained vulnerable to terrorist attacks.” 
It is worth noting that the time period of 2010 to 2012, when Kenya registered a 
spike in the number of terrorist attacks, coincided with the time period when Al 
Shabaab was officially affiliated to Al Qaeda, and had thereby gained significant 
reinforcement of foreign fighters to its rank and file purposely to foster and 
strengthen Al Qaeda’s doctrine, ideology, and targeting strategy. For instance, 
the terrorist attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, was planned and 
executed by a cell of Al Shabaab’s foreign fighters, who are believed to have 
disguised themselves as refugees and entered Kenya from neighboring Somalia. 
START (2013, p. 3) reports that “between 2008 and 2012, 65 percent of all 
terrorist attacks in Kenya are attributed to Al-Shabaab.”  
The author hypothesizes that Al Shabaab operatives may often take 
advantage of refugee status to freely diffuse into Kenyan Somali communities 
from where they clandestinely recruit, plan, and establish terrorist franchise cells 
with freedom of movement and action for targeting opportunities. The use of 
refugee camps was noted by Nzes (2012) who observed that, “on October 13, 
2011, suspected Al-Shabaab militants kidnapped two female Spanish Me’decins 
Sans Frontieres (MSF) aid workers from Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, and 
took them to Somalia.”  
There are substantial Muslim populations in many Kenyan cities, the 
majority of which are of Somali descent, and who are therefore prone to 
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radicalization by Islamist extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia and 
Al-Qaeda in East Africa. “Many Muslims in Kenya also live in Eastleigh 
neighborhood of Nairobi. Eastleigh is often called ‘Little Mogadishu,’ and is 
almost home to Somali refugees who, over the years, have fled the violence and 
instability in their home country” (Nzes, 2012). 
B. PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL CAUSES  
According to prior research by other authors, there are factors that could 
explain the problems and causes associated with transnational terrorism in 
Kenya. Some of the factors directly explain the causes of terrorist attacks, and 
other factors explain facilitation of the attacks. Otiso (2009, p. 111) observes that 
“Kenya is a good target of global terrorism because of the combination of 
geographical, regional, historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural factors.” 
These factors include the following: 
The country’s close ties with Israeli and Western countries; its 
vibrant coastal beach tourism industry that is at odds with the 
locally dominant Islamic religion and culture; the perception that the 
country’s predominantly Christian population is an obstacle to 
Islamization of East Africa; its strategic geographical location 
relative to Europe, Asia, and neighboring African countries; porous 
borders; unstable neighboring countries especially Somalia and 
South Sudan; relatively open and multicultural society; relatively 
large Muslim population; the political and socio-economic 
deprivation of the coastal population relative to the rest of the 
country.  
These factors are constant, and therefore, cannot explain variations over 
time, particularly the recent increase in terrorism. While the factors mentioned 
above may have been important causes of terrorism in Kenya before 2010, other 
situational and circumstantial factors, such as the influx of Somali refugees and 
military involvement in Somalia, may offer better explanations for the causes of 
the rapid increase of transnational terrorism in Kenya after 2010. The numbers 
presented in Table 2 demonstrate that the number of Somali refugees in Kenya 
grew rapidly in the last few years, just as violence levels were increasing. This 
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shows that there seems to be at least a correlation between these two variables. 
Chapter II will explore the causal connection in more detail. 
 




KENYA 2007 199,570  
2008 242,700 21.6 
2009 352,720 45.3 
2010 385,000   9.2 
2011 479,000 24.4 
2012 546,320 14.0 
2013 492,046   9.9 
Table 2.   Influx of Somali Refugees in Kenya for the Study Period 
(from UNHCR, 2013). 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
In this chapter, the author has described the main research puzzle by 
counter-arguing the conventional wisdom that countries that contribute more 
troops to AMISOM are vulnerable to retaliatory terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab. 
The author has hypothesized that the influx of Somali refugees is the main cause 
of rapid increase in terrorist violence in Kenya. Using quantitative charts derived 
from the GTD database, the author illustrates the level of terrorist violence in 
East Africa from 1998 to 2012. Chapter II will introduce the theoretical 
mechanisms relative to the research hypothesis, and it will expound on relevant 
evidence from neighboring countries. Chapter III will discuss four terrorist attacks 
as case studies focusing on the scale, perpetration, and impact of each attack. 
The relevancy of available empirical evidence to support the research theory and 
hypothesis will be emphasized for each case. Consequently, the author will 
suggest recommendations for future policies aimed at deterrence, disruption, and 
defeat of transnational terror networks which are supported by Somali refugee 
communities in East Africa.   
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II. THEORETICAL MECHANISMS 
This chapter explains how the influx of Somali refugees may be connected 
to the recent increase of terrorism in Kenya. There are three reasons that we 
might expect there to be a causal connection between refugees and terrorism: 1) 
terrorists can recruit other terrorists from the Kenyan Somali refugee and 
business communities, 2) refugees and refugee camps offer accessibility to 
targeting opportunities, and 3) refugee camps give safe havens for terrorists’ 
sanctuary and freedom of action. In Kenya, Somali refugees are particularly 
notable because some of the Somali refugees were integrated into Kenyan cities 
where they established local businesses, but most of them lived in predominantly 
Somali-Kenyan communities.  
Since the resurgence of Al Shabaab in the fall of 2006, and subsequent 
inception of AMISOM in January 2007, Kenya has experienced an abrupt surge 
in the influx of refugees who fled the fighting between the Islamist militants and 
the Somali National Army (SNA) supported by AMISOM. Consequently, the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) established and 
commissioned Dadaab refugee camp in North-Eastern Kenya. At the same time, 
some Kenyan cities experienced a boom in their Somali refugee populations. For 
instance, in the Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi, the oldest Somali-Kenyan refugee 
and business community has received and accommodated greater numbers of 
Somali refugee families. The heavily congested, but commercially busy slum of 
Eastleigh, also nicknamed ‘little Mogadishu’ could represent a strategic safe 
haven for terrorists, both in terms of recruitment and targeting opportunities. 
Figure 3 shows the location of Eastleigh suburb near Nairobi city. 
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 Figure 3.  Location of Eastleigh in the Kenyan Capital Nairobi (from 
Google, 2014). 
As the Somali refugee population skyrocketed in Kenya between 2007 
and 2012, it was evident that the level of violence stemming from Somali refugee 
communities escalated as well and thus compelled the Kenyan security agencies 
to intervene accordingly. Unfortunately, Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2013a, p. 
3) reported that “Kenyan security force abuses in 2009, 2010, and 2012 included: 
torture, rape, and other serious forms of violence against Somali Kenyans and 
Somali refugees throughout Kenya’s predominantly Somali inhabited North-
Eastern region.”  
The Eastleigh suburb is Nairobi’s most chaotic and violent community, and 
is often marred by riots and sectarian violence. The nature and level of violence 
is similar to the Somali capital Mogadishu before it was fully liberated by 
AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces in 2011. The 
liveliness, business enterprises, and clan rivalries in the Bakara market of 
Mogadishu are seemingly replicated in the trade and business dynamics in 
Eastleigh.  
 8 
Deadly riots caused by ethnic and sectarian divisions in the Eastleigh 
suburb are often ignited by rivalries between informal groups of indigenous 
Somali-Kenyans and extremist factions of ethnic Somalis as they struggle to 
compete for scarce but lucrative business opportunities. Many local businesses 
in the suburb are directly managed or indirectly owned by ethnic Somalis who 
lived and worked in the diaspora areas of Europe, Asia, and North America for 
the past two decades. Nevertheless, persistent riots in Eastleigh often escalate 
into terrorist violence which occasionally spreads beyond the suburb to other 
parts of Nairobi city. This supports the notion that most of the terrorist violence is 
orchestrated by Somali refugees who make up more than 90 percent of 
Eastleigh’s population. The perpetrators of the terrorist violence seem to have a 
wider agenda when using Eastleigh as a stepping stone to execute missions of 
launching targeted terrorist attacks in Nairobi’s administrative and business 
centers. Capital Reporter (2012, p. 1) notes that “police in Nairobi thwarted what 
would have been a deadly terror attack in the city after they recovered a cache of 
deadly terror weapons and arrested two suspects of Somali origin at a house in 
Eastleigh area.” Figure 4 shows a sample of the recovered weapons. 
 
Figure 4.  Cache of Arms Recovered in Eastleigh on September 14, 
2012 (from Capital FM). 
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A. RECRUITMENT OF SOMALI REFUGEES 
Kenya accommodates the majority of the Somali refugee population in 
East Africa, but the Somali community maintains deep socio-cultural divisions 
with the Kenyan population. Some of the differences may be drawn along 
religion, governance, and socio-economic structure. For instance, whereas most 
Kenyans are Christians, Somalis are predominantly Muslim, and whereas 
Kenyans have experienced more than four decades of democratic governance, 
Somalis have a long background of political turmoil, military dictatorship, and 
lawlessness. 
The lengthy absence of central democratic governance in Somalia 
between 1990 and 2012 triggered the resurgence of several clan based and 
religiously inspired terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab, which recently gained 
the capacity to operate beyond Somalia’s borders. Being host to many Somali 
refugees and a full-fledged democracy, Kenya is an obvious target of radical 
Islamic militant groups for recruitment, training, planning, and subsequent attacks 
on high-value targets. Publically available information and credible media reports 
indicate that high profile members of the al-Qaeda affiliate Al Shabaab are 
actively recruiting Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees from parts of Kenya and 
refugee camps in particular. Kouri (2014, p. 1) reports that  
law enforcement and security officials are eager to arrest Abdikadir 
Mohamed Abdikadir, a/k/a ‘Ikrima’ a Kenyan citizen born in 
Mombasa, and known for recruiting young Kenyans for Al 
Shabaab’s Kenyan Islamists in Somalia. 
The Kenyan security agencies stepped up cross-border operations along 
the Somalia border to counter any possible human trafficking of recruits and 
trained fighters across the two countries’ common border. Nevertheless, Al 
Shabaab’s operatives and recruiters take advantage of Kenya and Somalia’s 
direct access to the Indian Ocean. The Kenyan Navy and Coast Guard are not 
logistically equipped to sustain consistent maritime surveillance and routine 
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security operations along the coastline; this constraint offers terrorists and 
recruiters freedom of entry and exit. Anzalone (2012, p. 1) attests that  
Since 2007, Al-Shabaab has recruited hundreds of foreign fighters; 
the bulk of non-Somali foreign fighters, probably came from East 
African countries, and was recruited by Al-Shabaab’s regional 
allies, such as Kenya Muslim Youth Center (MYC).  
The situation of maritime insecurity is even worse along Somalia’s 
coastline on the Gulf of Eden and the Indian Ocean. Despite efforts and support 
by the international maritime joint task force, the Somali pirates continue to 
aggressively coordinate and facilitate transportation of people, guns, and money 
for Al Shabaab to and from Yemen and other friendly countries in the Arabian 
Peninsula and from Kenya as well. Mann (2013, p. 2) observes that 
Al Shabaab has been conducting raids, small scale attacks, 
smuggling operations, and fundraising inside Kenya, and has also 
aggressively sought to recruit new membership from Kenya’s 
roughly 2.4 million ethnic Somalis, in Kenya’s North Eastern 
Province, and there are worries about potential for radicalization 
among the roughly 500,000 Somali refugees in Kenya.  
B. PROXIMITY TO TARGETING OPPORTUNITIES 
Recently, transnational terrorists in East Africa demonstrated a high level 
of planning, sophistication, and effectiveness in terms of target sourcing and 
selection. Al-Shabaab’s foreign fighters, who are largely responsible for the 
recent surge of transnational terrorist violence in Kenya, often utilize the 
opportunity of possible cover and concealment offered by Somali refugee 
communities to infiltrate into Kenya’s cities and mainland for initial target 
reconnaissance and subsequent attacks. Otiso (2009, p. 114) observes that  
Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda have both managed to infiltrate cross-
border refugee traffic and some Somali refugee camps in Kenya’s 
North Eastern Province and have made their way into Somali 
dominated neighborhoods in Nairobi and Mombasa, and from these 
convenient hideouts, these terror groups have been able to map 
their targets and mount terror attacks. 
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Being densely populated and highly congested, the Somali dominated 
neighborhood of Eastleigh offers a potential for clandestine recruitment, training, 
and logistical facilitation for terror attacks.  
C. REFUGEE CAMPS AS SAFE HAVENS  
The final theoretical mechanism presented here is that refugee camps will 
be used by terrorists as safe havens where terrorists can easily access, plan, 
raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate freely and securely 
due to weak or inadequate governance. According to the Arab Times (2013, p.1), 
the Kenyan interior minister publicly decried the senseless terrorist violence 
perpetrated by some Somali refugees, yet a considerable number of them are 
not legally documented by Kenyan immigration department as refugees. He 
stressed the fact that  
for many years, Kenya has been host to the largest refugee 
community in the world with almost 600,000 refugees; some of 
these refugees have abused our hospitality and kindness to plan 
and launch terror attacks from safety of refugee camps. 
The minister’s comments came in the wake of a terrorist attack on the 
Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, and Kenya’s decision to repatriate Somali 
refugees back to their country. He further emphasized that “Somali refugee 
camps were being used as a safe haven for Islamist militants and the time had 
come for hundreds of thousands of refugees to go home” (Arab Times, 2013, p. 
2). 
The notion of refugee camps being used as terrorist safe havens is neither 
new nor unique on the global scene. Some countries in the Middle East 
experienced similar situations, which were widely generated by a resurgence of 
radical Islamic militancy and international terrorism. For instance, the U.S 
Department of State (2011) reports that “Palestinian refugee camps were also 
used as safe havens by Palestinian armed groups and are used to house 
weapons and shelter wanted criminals.” Similarly, the current political turmoil and 
civil conflict in South Sudan has displaced many people, and the majority of them 
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have sought refuge in Northern Uganda. According to Uganda’s security 
agencies and media reports, some of the undocumented Sudanese refugees are 
already on a rampage of ruthless armed robbery and terrorist violence in Uganda 
(UPF, 2014). 
With increased vigilance and mounted pressure by Kenyan law 
enforcement and security agencies to counter terrorist violence in refugee 
camps, Al Shabaab militants have shifted tactics from seeking safe havens in 
refugee camps to other areas considered safer and more conducive for the 
transit of terrorists’ weaponry and recruits to and from Somalia. The Daily Nation 
(2013, p. 2) reported that  
Mohammed Seif confessed to police that he transported more than 
two dozen grenades from Somalia to Nairobi through the Kitui 
game reserve. The new revelation raises concerns that the game 
reserves are used as terrorist safe havens. 
Consequently, the Kenyan police have particularly embarked on routine 
surveillance of the semi-porous Somali-Kenya border, which some Al-Shabaab 
agents periodically exploited for clandestine entry to, and exit from, refugee 
camps located on the Kenyan side of the border. Relatedly, Momanyi (2013, p. 1) 
reported that “twenty-one Somali refugees were arrested and charged after 
police intercepted them at the Somali border while headed from a camp in Kenya 
to join an Al-Shabaab training base.” 
D. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES 
Kenya and Uganda have a long history and good reputations for hosting 
Somali refugees from 1990 to 2013; whereas Burundi and Rwanda have barely 
hosted any Somali refugees, and Tanzania hosted very few refugees, who were 
repatriated in 2013 after Somalia attained democratic governance. Other 
countries beyond East Africa also host a significant number of Somali refugees. 
According to data obtained from the United Nations Humanitarian Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), out of 1.015 million Somali refugees hosted in East 
Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula as of May 2013,  
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48.4 percent of them are hosted in other countries outside East Africa as follows: 
Djibouti (1.8 percent), Ethiopia (23.6 percent), Eritrea (0.34 percent), and Yemen 
(22.6 percent). 51.6 percent of the 1.015 million Somali refugees have been 
hosted in East African countries as follows: Kenya (48.5 percent), Uganda (2.9 
percent), and Tanzania (0.2 percent).  
Although 1.015 million ethnic Somalis sought refuge in neighboring 
countries, 1.106 million sought refuge within Somalia. They dwell in Internally 
Displaced Peoples (IDP) camps, and are administered by the Somali government 
supported by the United Nations Refugee Agency, UNHCR. Thus, out of an 
approximate 2.12 million Somali refugees, 52.1 percent of them have sought 
refuge within Somalia, and are sheltered in three provinces: Puntland (6.1 
percent), Somaliland (4.0 percent), and South/Central (42.1 percent). Figure 5 
illustrates the trend of Somali refugee influx in East Africa from 2007 to 2013. 
 




The Somali refugee trend in East Africa clearly shows that Kenya hosted 
more refugees than all her neighbors. The trend further suggests that Kenya 
hosted many Somali refugees well before 2007, which partly explains why Kenya 
currently has such a large population of Somali Kenyans. It is also important to 
note that Kenya experienced sectarian violence and insecurity purportedly 
engineered by Somali refugees even before 2007. As Aronson (2011, pp. 1–2) 
attests  
President Daniel Arap Moi instituted a policy in 2001 that officially 
closed the Kenya-Somali border. Moi exclaimed that, “although 
Kenya showed hospitality by accommodating refugees from 
Somalia, they [refugees] abused their welcome by bringing illegal 
firearms into the country.” 
Figure 6 shows the geographical distribution of the total and influx of 
Somali refugees in neighboring countries as of May 2013. 
 
Figure 6.  Somali Refugee Influx as of May 2013 (from UNHCR, 2013).  
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III. CASE STUDIES 
In this chapter, the author discusses four of the six largest terrorist attacks 
in Kenya since 2007. Each attack will be described in detail, with particular 
emphasis on the role that refugees and refugee camps played in the attacks. In 
particular: (1) the September 21, 2013, siege of Westgate mall in Nairobi; (2) the 
July 1, 2012, Garissa church attacks near Dadaab refugee camp; (3) the 
November 18, 2012, attack on a public bus in Eastleigh Suburb; and (4) the 
March 10, 2012, attack on a bus terminal in Nairobi city. For each attack, this 
study analyzes the empirical evidence relevant to the theory and hypothesis 
presented above. 
A. CASE I: ATTACK ON WESTGATE SHOPPING MALL ON SEPTEMBER 
21, 2013 
The attack and subsequent siege of Westgate mall is by far the biggest 
terrorist attack in Kenya since the 1998 U.S. embassy bombing at the heart of 
Nairobi city. Even though the location of Westgate shopping mall is not in 
proximity to any Somali refugee camp or Somali-Kenyan community, the author 
believes—based on the availability of credible evidence—that regardless of the 
scale of the attack, its perpetration could be well linked to Somali refugee 
communities. Hence, this case is relevant to the research theory and hypothesis. 
Availability of relevant empirical evidence could further justify and support the 
author’s belief. Most likely, the attackers targeted Westgate shopping mall for a 
variety of tactical and strategic reasons. Westgate shopping mall is a one-stop 
center in terms of service delivery, implying that the 68 lives that were lost during 
the attack were most likely from diverse origins and different nationalities.  
The Westgate shopping complex is an upscale market located in Kenya’s 
capital, Nairobi, at approximately 1.2 miles north of the city center. The shopping 
complex is particularly popular with indigenous as well as foreign customers, who 
are normally attracted to the world class businesses and recreational services 
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readily accessible at Westgate. A significant number of Westgate’s domestic 
clientele is comprised of well-educated and fully employed Kenyan professionals 
who work for corporate firms, government ministries, and non-governmental 
organizations. The majority of Westgate’s foreign customers include expatriate 
employees of various diplomatic missions and international organizations 
accredited to Kenya. Figure 7 is a view of the explosion at Westgate shopping 
mall on September 23, 2013. The gruesome attack and subsequent siege of the 
mall by Islamic militants seemed to have totally surprised Kenya’s security and 
intelligence apparatus. 
 
Figure 7.  Westgate Mall Explosion on September 23, 2013 (from The 
Independent@UK, 2014). 
The environment and shopping experience at Westgate portrays Kenya’s 
anticipated economic transition from third world to first world, and this could be 
the reason why the upscale shopping complex is popular amongst foreign 
nationals, expatriates, diplomats, and tourists from Asia, Europe, South Africa, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Bruton (2013, p. 5) notes 
that “Nairobi is East Africa’s most prosperous hub, full of Western tourists, 
business interests, aid operations, and diplomats; the Westgate mall attack could 
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have killed shoppers from any corner of the globe.” It may be against this 
background that the Westgate mall qualified as a high-value target for radical 
Islamic militants, whose extremist ideology and socio-cultural beliefs vehemently 
oppose and seek to challenge the modernity of a secular and Western-oriented 
culture, which is considerably predominant in the East African region. For 
instance, in a deliberate attempt to avoid Muslim casualties during the mall siege, 
the attackers openly segregated amongst their hostages by freeing those who 
ably identified themselves as Muslims; as Howden (2013, p. 2) reported, “The 
heavily armed militants were separating Muslims from non-Muslims and killing 
scores of weekend shoppers.” 
1. Perpetration, Scale, and Impact of the Attack 
At least 67 innocent lives were lost in this single attack and more than 150 
shoppers sustained injuries. Although no group has officially declared 
responsibility for the attack, it is widely accepted that most of the attackers were 
Al-Shabaab foreign fighters. However, it is worth noting that the uniqueness, 
targeting strategy, and nature of the Westgate attack caused enormous suspicion 
as to whether Al-Shabaab still had the capacity to plan and execute such a high 
profile cross-border attack using a very different tactical approach from what is 
generally perceived of the Somali-based militant group. Before the spectacular 
and fatal Westgate mall attack, the other large scale cross-border attack by Al-
Shabaab was the July 2010 twin bombing of a popular sports bar and restaurant 
in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, where the group’s tactical assault on the 
targets was achieved by accurate and prompt use of suicide bombers. Similarly, 
START (2013, p. 4) observes that “to date, the attack at Westgate mall is Al-
Shabaab’s only recorded hostage-barricade attack, in which perpetrators occupy 
a location and hold hostages on site rather than abducting them.” 
The different tactical approach employed by the militants who attacked the 
Westgate mall made it difficult for security analysts to authoritatively confirm that 
Al-Shabaab was the actual perpetrator of the attack, contrary to the group’s 
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media claims. However, as events unfolded and investigations on the attack 
intensified, the Kenyan police obtained circumstantial and situational evidence 
linking some refugees in Kenyan camps to terrorists in Somalia. This compelled 
the police to implement a series of drastic security measures aimed at prohibiting 
Al-Shabaab’s foreign operatives from using Somali refugee camps as safe 
havens for terrorist activities in Kenya. To this end, Momanyi (2013, p. 1) 
reported that “Police stepped up security surveillance at the Kenya-Somalia 
boarder and in refugee camps after it emerged that terror attacks are plotted at 
the camps, including the September 21 attack at the Westgate shopping mall.” 
Since the Westgate mall siege, the Kenyan government has adopted a 
tough stance against illegal immigrants. For instance, a series of grenade attacks 
in Nairobi city in the fall of 2013, rekindled the memories of the Westgate mall 
attack, prompting the Kenyan police to focus on pursuit of illegal immigrants, 
especially undocumented ethnic Somalis. Wabala (2014, p. 1) reports that “some 
82 Somalis arrested in the ongoing operation in Eastleigh have been deported 
back to Mogadishu.” On a similar note, Deutsche Welle (2014, p. 1) reports that  
three blasts in Eastleigh on March 31 that killed six people appear 
to have triggered the latest police crackdown, although frequent 
swoops on Somalis have been taking place since last September’s 
deadly siege of the Westgate shopping mall for which Al-Shabaab 
claimed responsibility.  
2. Empirical Evidence Relevant to Theory and Hypothesis 
From the day of the attack, a joint task force of security analysts, forensic 
experts, Interpol, and law enforcement agencies comprised of American, British, 
Israeli, and Kenyan counterterrorism officials has worked to find credible 
evidence to authoritatively link the Westgate mall attack to any regional and/or 
international terrorist organization. However, according to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) office in Nairobi, Kenya, the investigation was derailed 
because none of the four militants survived the attack; the remains of the three 
bodies recovered in the rubble were severely disfigured and not in good enough 
condition to support any forensic investigation. An excerpt from an interview with 
 20 
Dennis Brady titled “On the Ground in Kenya, Terror at the Westgate Mall,” 
conducted on January 10, 2014, by the FBI, demonstrates these limitations. The 
interviewee is the bureau’s legal attaché in Nairobi, Kenya:  
Qn: Where Does the Investigation Stand Now?  
Brady: The Kenyans have charged four individuals in connection 
with the terror attack, and the case is moving through the court 
process. The four are directly connected to individuals who 
physically carried out the attack. Nobody is under the impression 
that we have fully identified the entire network in this attack, 
however, that is why the investigation continues. 
In terms of the hypothesis of this study, it is worth noting that the four 
individuals who were arrested and charged by Kenyan courts are all ethnic 
Somalis. After a thorough investigation by Kenyan police and subsequent cross 
examination by the court, some of them were found to have entered into Kenya 
illegally by disguising themselves as refugees and deliberately evading the 
documentation procedure of the Kenyan immigration department. Al Jazeera 
news (2013, p. 2) reported that  
a court ordered four men, Mohammed Ahmed Abdi, Liban Abdi 
Omar, Hussein Hassan Mustafah, and Aden Dheq, imprisoned until 
the next court hearing. None are accused of being gunmen in the 
mall; Abdi Omar and Mustafah were charged with knowingly 
supporting the attackers, entering Kenya illegally, and obtaining 
false identification documents. Dheq was accused of harboring 
someone authorities say is a senior Al-Shabaab leader. 
One of the two men (Abdi Omar) charged by the Kenyan court for 
knowingly supporting the Westgate mall attackers had confessed through a 
narrative posted online immediately after the attack. If Omar’s narrated 
confession is authentic, the Kenyan court would derive resourceful details from 
the narrative, and the details could provide credible evidence on the perpetrators. 
In particular, in Omar’s narrated confession he mentions that some Somali 
Islamic fighters who once served as Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) soldiers had 
good connections with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia long before the 
Westgate attack.  
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Until the fall of 2008, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam formed the militant 
wing of the Islamic Courts Union whose leader Sheik Sherrif Ahmed soon 
became Somalia’s second President of the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) in February 2009, supported by the United Nations, United States of 
America, European Union, and African Union. Upon Sheik Sherrif’s acceptance 
to lead the TFG, the militant wing of the then ICU refused to be part of TFG, 
hence the resurgence of a stronger Al-Shabaab to fight the TFG and its 
international allies. Omar (2013, p. 2) narrates 
when KDF went to fight in Somalia, I was in Kenya. I had already 
asked to leave KDF. I stayed for over one year in Mombasa. Al 
Shabaab was paying fighters very good money for killings and for 
kidnappings. Most fighters were from Afmadow but some lived in 
Mombasa. The ones in Kenya were organized by Habib Gani who 
later left Kenya and went to fight in Somalia. In May this year 2013, 
I received a call from a person who said he was with me in KDF. He 
wanted me to help them. It was strange because KDF has so many 
fighters and at this time, several Islamic fighters were kidnapped 
and killed. 
Omar’s assertion that “most fighters were from Afamadow but some lived 
in Mombasa” provides further evidence of the causal connection between 
refugee populations and terrorist violence in Kenya. It seems likely that the 
Islamic fighters from Afamadow, Somalia, entered Kenya disguised as refugees, 
and established a safe haven in the Somali-Kenyan Community in Mombasa. It 
also seems reasonable to suppose that some of the surviving Somali Islamic 
fighters, Abdi Omar inclusive, could have teamed up to execute the Westgate 
mall attack on behalf of Al-Shabaab. As Omar (2013) notes, “Al-Shabaab paid 
fighters very good money for killings and kidnappings.” Omar’s online confession, 
if authentic, thus represents strong empirical evidence for the hypothesis 
presented previously, that terrorist violence in Kenya has been facilitated by the 
influx of Somali refugees.  
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B. CASE II: ATTACK ON GARISSA CHURCHES ON JULY 1, 2012  
The attack by unidentified gunmen on Garissa churches probably signifies 
a different dimension in Kenya’s demeanor of terrorist violence, which further 
suggests that a physical war of religions especially between Muslims and 
Christians could be imminent. In other countries, like the Central African Republic 
(CAR), this type of war is real and ongoing, whereby Christians are reportedly 
determined to eliminate Muslims permanently. The Northeastern part of Kenya is 
more likely to follow suit with Muslims taking an upper hand against Christians. 
Nonetheless, the author believes that this attack is a good case study for the 
theory and hypothesis of this research because the Garissa churches that were 
attacked on July 1, 2012, are located near Dadaab refugee camp. For instance, 
the gunmen involved in the deadly attacks in Garissa operated and behaved 
contrary to the conventional wisdom about most armed terrorists being Islamic 
militants. Unlike the Westgate mall attackers who reportedly endeavored to 
protect Muslims to minimize Muslim casualties, the gunmen who often target and 
terrorize communities in Northeastern Kenya exercise no discrimination based on 
religious affiliations of the targeted communities; both Muslim and non-Muslims 
are equally vulnerable. Ombati (2013, p. 1) further observes that a few months 
before the Garissa church attack, “At least seven villagers were killed when 
gunmen opened fire on worshippers in a mosque in a village near Liboi at the 
Kenya-Somalia border, about 25 kilometers from the Dadaab refugee camp.” 
The gunmen’s unique behavior caused significant controversy amidst 
Kenyan security agencies that had initially attributed the church attacks to the 
Islamic militant group, Al-Shabaab. Interestingly, neither Al-Shabaab nor any 
other terrorist group has publicly claimed responsibility for the Garissa church 
attacks. Since 2007, the Northeastern part of Kenya has registered the highest 
count of fatal terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Shabaab. Local communities and 
government installations in Garissa County near the Dadaab refugee complex 
have been particularly vulnerable. Ombati (2013, p. 2) notes, “In the past year 
there have been over 40 attacks in Kenya involving grenades or explosive 
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devices, leaving at least 100 people dead, and around 220 injured. At least 15 of 
these attacks occurred in Northeastern province mainly in Dadaab, Wajir, and 
Garissa.” The refugee complex comprises at least five camps and makes 
Dadaab the largest refugee complex in Africa. As of February 2013, the Heritage 
Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) reported that “three of the camps were 
operating well beyond their intended capacity; IfoI, Dagahley, and Hagader were 
intended for a total of 90,000 inhabitants, but are currently hosting approximately 
450,000 refugees” (Ombati, 2013, p. 8). 
1. Perpetration, Scale, and Impact of the Attack 
According to information provided by Kenyan security agencies and 
reports from several media organizations, the most probable perpetrator of the 
Garissa church attacks is Al-Shabaab. However, it is imperative to note that for 
most attacks, there has always been little or no conclusive evidence to officially 
accuse Al-Shabaab. Contrary to Al-Shabaab’s normal practice of claiming 
responsibility for high profile terrorist attacks, no particular group has claimed 
responsibility for the Garissa church attacks. According to the BBC’s news 
anchor in Nairobi, Mwachiro (2012, p. 2) reported that “No group has yet said it 
carried out the attacks, but the finger of blame will undoubtedly be pointed at Al-
Shabaab or its sympathizers.” 
The attacks on two different churches in Garissa on July 1, 2012, claimed 
18 lives and injured at least 60 worshipers, and are by far the biggest and most 
fatal attacks in that part of Kenya since 2007. BBC News (2012, p. 1) reported 
that  
Kenya’s North-Eastern Regional Police Chief mentioned that 
Garissa is the region’s provincial capital, at about 140km (90 miles 
from the Somali border and it is close to Dadaab refugee camp 
where gunmen attacked the town’s Catholic church and African 
Inland Church (AIC), shot two policemen outside of the churches, 
and grenades were thrown inside. As the panicked congregation 
rushed to escape, gunmen fired on them.  
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Figure 8.  Kenyan Map Showing Locations of Dadaab Refugee Complex 
and Town of Garissa (from AFP, 2012). 
2. Empirical Evidence Relevant to Theory and Hypothesis 
Acts of terrorism, such as kidnapping of aid workers from refugee camps 
in Kenya and subsequently holding them hostage in Al-Shabaab controlled areas 
in Somalia, have confirmed that the hostage takers and the perpetrators of 
terrorist attacks on various targets of opportunity in Kenyan cities are indeed well 
linked and coordinated for cross-border operations. For the case of the Garissa 
attacks, it was easier for perpetrators to succeed in planning and executing their 
mission because of the cover and concealment provided by a vast Somali 
refugee populace and a predominantly Somali-Kenyan Muslim community in the 
Northeastern Province. The gunmen are believed to have utilized Dadaab 
refugee camp as a safe haven to reconnoiter and plot their targets clandestinely 
without detection by the Kenyan police. It is also worth mentioning that the 
Garissa church attacks were a “slap in the face” to Kenyan police and other 
security organs; hardly had the search operation for four aid workers kidnapped 
from Dadaab refugee camp commenced, before the attackers turned their guns 
and grenades on Christian churches in the vicinity of the refugee camp. To this 
end, Shephard (2012, p. 2) observed that  
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As the search continued in the nearby town of Garissa for four aid 
workers from Canada, Norway, and the Philippines, who were 
abducted by gunmen on Friday morning from the Dadaab refugee 
camp, masked assailants attacked churches with grenades and 
gunfire killing at least 15 worshippers and wounding dozens. 
Approximately two years later, the investigations about the perpetrators of 
the Garissa church attacks continue; however, there seems to be no conclusive 
evidence on the actual identities of the gunmen. Almost all security and law 
enforcement agencies in East Africa suspect Al-Shabaab. It is imperative to 
observe that the church attacks in Garissa occurred immediately after “four aid 
workers from Canada, Norway, and the Philippines” were kidnapped at gunpoint 
from Dadaab refugee complex, and taken hostage in neighboring Somalia. 
Figure 9 shows a picture of the church scene immediately after the fatal attack.  
 
Figure 9.  Attack Scene inside African Inland Church in Garissa on July 
1, 2012 (from NTV, 2012). 
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Moreover, the Kenyan media reported that after a brief but thorough 
investigation of the church attacks, Kenyan security analysts dismissed a 
possible connection of the gunmen to any terrorist group. Maina (2012, p. 1) 
reported that  
Anti-terrorism investigators have ruled out the involvement of Al-Shabaab 
in the attacks on two churches in Garissa. They are now focusing on fresh leads 
that the attacks were motivated by either local tensions between Muslims and 
Christians or a politically motivated crime. The investigators reached that 
conclusion after analyzing four incidents in Garissa in the past six months. Figure 
10 is a map of Kenya showing an approximation of the geographical location of 
the Garissa church attacks.  
 
Figure 10.  Location of Church Attacks in Garissa on July 1, 2012 (from 
Nation.com, 2012). 
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It seems likely that the investigations by the Kenyan police that 
downplayed the possibility of Al-Shabaab’s involvement, omitted a significant 
aspect associated with the different tactical approach used by Al-Shabaab as 
means to achieve their ends. Indeed, the tactical approach of kidnapping and 
hostage taking is not new. For instance, before the International Joint Maritime 
Task Force intensified surveillance and maritime operations on the Indian Ocean 
and the Gulf of Eden, pirates enjoyed limitless freedom of action on Somali 
coastal waters from where they occasionally hijacked commercial vessels and 
crews in exchange for ransom money, and a considerable portion of the ransom 
money financed Al-Shabaab’s budget for recruitment, training, and arming of 
pirates. It is against this background that pirates who used to be agents and 
collaborators of Al-Shabaab, changed tactics from hijacking of commercial ships 
and crews to kidnapping of expatriate workers, foreign nationals, and tourists. 
Once piracy was no longer lucrative due to intervention and operationalization of 
the Joint Maritime Task Force on the Indian Ocean, the former pirates turned to 
kidnapping of targeted individuals mainly from insecure environs such as refugee 
camps. In a similar manner, Al-Shabaab agents disguise themselves as refugees 
for purposes of gaining direct proximity to targets and other targeting 
opportunities. Reed and Saul (2011, p. 3) noted that, “people are taken from the 
coast of Kenya and then facilitated all the way through Al-Shabaab held areas 
and delivered to an area held by pirates and negotiated by pirate gangs.”  
Even though these observations do not provide direct confirmation of the 
theory and hypothesis of this study, they are nevertheless suggestive. Moreover, 
the close timing and almost simultaneous occurrence of the Garissa church 
attacks and the kidnapping of aid workers from Dadaab refugee camp, provides 
firm ground for which the two terrorist incidents can be re-investigated 
concurrently. This is based on the insight that defunct piracy groups from the 
Somali coastal waters may have turned their focus to kidnapping and hostage 
taking of vulnerable and unsuspecting individuals for ransom money, just as the 
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pirates used to hijack commercial ships and crews before the pirates were 
denied freedom of action and subsequently defeated on the Indian Ocean. 
C. CASE III: ATTACK ON A BUS IN EASTLEIGH SUBURB ON 
NOVEMBER 18, 2012  
The main mode of transportation to and from Eastleign, a suburb on the 
outskirts of Nairobi city, is by minibus, popularly called ‘matatus’ in the local 
dialect. The majority of passengers who travel by minibus to and from Easleigh 
are ethnic Somalis and Somali-Kenyans. The type of improvised explosive 
device (IED) that blew up the Eastleigh bus was most probably homemade, after 
which, the attackers smuggled it aboard the bus stealthily. Much of Eastleigh is a 
heavily-congested slum with many semi-permanent structures reminiscent of 
terrorists’ safe havens for clandestine operations due to good cover and 
concealment. The author believes that the Eastleigh bus attack is a good case 
study because any empirical evidence about the attack is more likely to justify 
and support the theory and hypothesis of this research. Notably, Eastleigh is 
home to many Somali refugees who purportedly escape from refugee camps in 
pursuit of employment opportunities for better liveliness.  
The Eastleigh suburb and its environs have registered the highest level of 
terrorist violence in Kenya since 2007. The suburb hosts a significant population 
of Somali immigrants and has gradually developed into an active business area; 
the main economic hub of diaspora Somalis who opt to invest their foreign 
exchange earnings and savings in Kenya. Mengo (2011, p. 2) attested that “the 
area is perhaps Nairobi’s most active commercial center, slowly taking over from 
the central business district.” For the past five years, the suburb has hosted 
increasing numbers of illegal and undocumented immigrants, mainly Somali 
refugees from refugee camps in the North-Eastern part of Kenya. The suburb 
lacks an adequate transport terminal for public service vehicles, which would 
facilitate security screening of passengers and their luggage. Figure 11 shows 
one of Eastleigh’s public transportation terminals during a normal working day.  
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Figure 11.  Eastleigh’s Public Transportation Area (from Business Daily 
Africa, 2012). 
1. Perpetration, Scale, and Impact of the Attack 
The perpetrators of terrorist violence in Eastleigh are fond of hurling 
grenades, torching petrol bombs, indiscriminate arson, and detonation of home-
made IEDs as a means to achieve their ends. START (2013, p. 2) attests that 
“Al-Shabaab’s most commonly used tactics include bombings and armed 
assaults, which comprise 72.6 percent of all the attacks.” The perpetrators of the 
bus attack reportedly detonated an IED on a public transportation bus resulting in 
the loss of at least ten lives and injuring thirty. START (2013, p. 2) further 
reported that “[n]o group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, one 
individual was taken into custody following the bombing.” The Kenyan police 
stormed Eastleigh suburb in pursuit of the attackers and evidence to apprehend 
any suspects, and to counter the deadly riots that erupted after the attack, 
culminating in widespread violence and looting of Somali owned businesses. 
“The Nairobi Police Chief urged Muslims and Christians in the area to resist 
attacking each other” (Sabahi, 2012, p. 2). 
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The Kenyan authorities have resolved to support and implement a strict 
and timely effort to crackdown on illegal immigrants, subsequently expediting the 
expatriation of mainly Somali refugees. However, some international 
humanitarian agencies have criticized Kenya’s actions by alleging that massive 
human rights’ violations and abuses have occurred. The Kenyan government has 
not officially responded to these allegations and criticisms, but it has locally 
defended its actions as necessary and sufficient internal security mechanisms to 
counter transnational terrorism and minimize terrorist violence, which is often 
orchestrated by illegal immigrants who disguise themselves as refugees and/or 
asylum seekers. To this end, HRW (2013b, p. 2) observed that  
Somali and Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers who had lived 
for many years with their families in Eastleigh told Human Rights 
Watch that police rampaged through the suburb beginning on 
November 19, 2012, a day after identified people attacked a 
minibus, killing at least 7 people and injuring 30. 
The tough actions by Kenya’s law enforcement and security officials have 
strained the hitherto brotherly co-existence of ethnic Somalis, Somali-Kenyans, 
and indigenous Kenyans. The Somali communities claim that the strict measures 
adopted and implemented by Kenyan authorities, are based on ethnicity which 
may eventually culminate into ethnic profiling. These actions may compel some 
members of the affected communities to take risky and desperate decisions in an 
effort to deliberately avoid forced repatriation to Somalia. A prominent Somali-
Kenyan businessman in Eastleigh voiced his concerns regarding the level of 
frustration, humiliation, and embarrassment that most Somalis have endured the 
tough actions undertaken by Kenyan officials. Raghavan (2013, p. 3) quoted the 
business man saying, “If authorities made a crackdown, arrested people, and 
tortured them; that will not help their cause because such actions might drive 
some Somalis to join Al-Shabaab.” 
The strategic concern of the Kenyan authorities is that some business 
proceeds from Eastleigh could be indirectly financing Al-Shabaab’s transnational 
engagements. Raghavan (2013, p. 4) further noted that “Eastleigh according to 
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U.N and Kenyan officials as well as regional analysts, is a safe haven for Al-
Shabaab operatives and an important source of recruitment and funding for the 
militia.” A significant number of Somali business owners claim that the profits 
from their businesses contribute to Kenya’s internal revenue, and support their 
jobless and impoverished relatives in Somalia. Nevertheless, the Kenyan 
authorities argue that much of the monetary profits from Eastleigh are neither 
monitored properly nor accounted for by Kenya’s internal revenue service. 
2. Empirical Evidence Relevant to Theory and Hypothesis 
In the aftermath of the November 18, 2012, bus attack, Eastleigh was 
rocked with violent riots. The Kenyan police intervened promptly to halt the riots 
and take control of the situation. The police subsequently launched investigations 
to find any credible evidence that would facilitate apprehension of suspects. A 
report about the findings is not yet published, and no group has publicly claimed 
responsibility for the bus attack. However, based on situational and 
circumstantial evidence stemming from the violent riots that erupted after the 
attack, it appears likely that the attack was religiously inspired. Moreover, various 
media reports indicated that the riots were ethnically biased and religiously 
inspired with Muslims and Christians attacking each other.   
However, firm conclusions about the attack are still difficult. The Kenyan 
police embarked on a massive investigation to find credible evidence that could 
link the attacks to the possible resurgence of an informal militia group and/or 
terrorist network in Eastleigh. The sole aim of the investigation was to establish if 
the perpetrators of the attacks were religiously inspired, politically motived, 
and/or ethnically biased. Ramah (2012, p. 1) notes that  
To get to the bottom of the recent terrorist attacks and find solutions 
to the problem, the government will form a ten-member 
investigation committee comprised of five government officials and 
five members drawn from the Eastleigh business community. 
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Figure 12 shows Eastleigh residents viewing a wreckage of the minibus 
after it was hit by an IED in the neighborhood of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, 
November 18, 2012.  
 
Figure 12.  The Scene of a Minibus Attack in Eastleigh, November 18, 
2012 (from Reuters, 2012). 
Notably the ten-member committee formed by the Kenyan government to 
investigate all terrorist attacks in Eastleigh has not published its official findings. 
Until the committee publishes its findings, the anticipated empirical evidence to 
support a causal connection between the November 18, 2012, bus attack and the 
hypothesis of this study may be hard to authenticate.  
D. CASE IV: ATTACK ON A NAIROBI BUS TERMINAL ON MARCH 10, 
2012 
The Machakos bus terminal is Nairobi’s busiest and handles a variety of 
human and vehicle traffic. Bus terminals are prone to terrorist attacks due to a 
variety of human traffic which transits through the terminals daily. For instance, 
many public bus terminals in Nairobi handle long fleets of regional traffic and 
huge volumes of cargo mainly to and from countries within the Great Lakes 
Region (GLR) of East and Central Africa. The March 10, 2012, attack on 
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Machakos reportedly claimed nine lives and wounded dozens of passengers. 
Since then similar attacks have occurred in other Kenyan cities, particularly in 
Mombasa. This attack is an interesting case study for this research because 
Machakos area hosts a considerable number of Somali-Kenyan businesses; 
more so, a majority of the regional buses that transit beyond Kenyan borders to 
neighboring countries, are owned and operated by Somalis. 
The grenade attack on a crowded bus terminal at the heart of Nairobi’s 
central business district shocked Kenya’s internal security, counterterrorism, and 
law enforcement officials. Public transportation terminals and service vehicle 
boarding points are among the hot spots viewed as potential high value targets 
for terrorists. For Nairobi’s central business district, extra caution is taken by the 
Kenyan police to ensure that the most vulnerable spots within public facilities are 
fully secured and routinely monitored to enforce and maximize security of person 
and property. The year of 2012 was by far the most violent in Kenya. Out of 155 
attacks that occurred since 2007, 79 (51 percent) of them occurred in 2012 
alone. The attack on a bus terminal was one of several other attacks that rocked 
Kenyan cities and the countryside, and which practically overwhelmed the 
Kenyan authorities. Based on the conventional wisdom drawn from Al-Shabaab’s 
public and political propaganda, the attacks were deemed retaliatory and 
therefore attributed to Al-Shabaab. Notably, KDF had intervened in Southern 
Somalia barely five months before that Nairobi attack, and blame for the attack 
was geared towards the collaborators, sympathizers, and agents of East Africa’s 
Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab.  
1. Perpetration, Scale, and Impact of the Attack 
Unlike the November 18, 2012, minibus attack in Eastleigh, where an IED 
was detonated aboard, the attackers of an outdoor bus terminal in Nairobi 
unleashed grenades from a moving vehicle directly onto the target. This tactic 
used by the perpetrators to assault the target was reminiscent of the technique 
used by Al-Shabaab’s mobile squad during a series of attacks on IDP camps in 
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Somalia in the fall of 2011. Even though no particular group publicly claimed 
responsibility for the Nairobi bus terminal attack, based on the author’s 
operational experience in Somalia between May 2011 and May 2012, it appears 
highly probable that the perpetrators of the March 2012 Nairobi attack were Al-
Shabaab operatives or its collaborators who might have had similar terrorist 
training and skills. Mokaya (2012, p. 1) reported that “four hand grenades were 
thrown from a passing vehicle into the Machakos bus station where people were 
either walking or standing waiting to board buses.” Figure 13 shows a typical 
outdoor bus terminal in Nairobi city during daytime.  
 
Figure 13.  The Machakos Public Bus Station in Nairobi City (from Sabahi, 
2012). 
The perpetrators appear to have selected their target purposely to 
maximize the opportunity of widening the scale and impact of the attack, because 
almost all bus terminals in Nairobi city are regional in terms of passengers who 
transit through the bus terminals daily. The attack could have killed or injured 
non-Kenyan nationals from neighboring countries, as the majority of them 
frequently travel by road to and from Kenya for business, leisure, and tourism, 
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and they use the bus terminals as transit and boarding points. Aljazeera (2013, p. 
2) reported that “nine people died and around 60 were injured in an attack on a 
Nairobi bus terminal, but Somalia’s Al-Shabaab rebel group denied involvement.” 
It is also worth mentioning that the attack could have been directed at 
foreign tourists who at times travel publicly by road from Jomo Kenyata 
International Airport or from the coastal towns on the Indian Ocean through 
Nairobi city to tourist destinations either within Kenya or in neighboring countries. 
Though the attack did not physically inflict high casualties, economically, it 
caused large negative impacts, such as a reduced influx of tourists and fewer 
passengers in the road transport sector due to fear and intimidation. On the other 
hand, from a security perspective, the attack had a positive impact by alerting 
Kenyan law enforcement agencies, internal security operatives, and 
counterterrorism officials to be more vigilant and assertive whilst on duty. The 
attack also impacted psychologically on residents of Nairobi city by imparting 
sudden fear and anxiety in their minds, by which they might gradually lose 
confidence and trust in the security agencies’ capacity to secure and safeguard 
East Africa’s main economic hub, the Kenyan capital. 
2. Empirical Evidence Relevant to Theory and Hypothesis 
The fact that no attackers or possible suspects were apprehended 
instantly hampered any efforts to obtain credible evidence. However, the Kenyan 
police in collaboration with the East African Joint Counterterrorism Center 
(EAJCTC) launched a formal investigation to hunt down, and eventually arrest 
possible suspects or the actual attackers. It may not be possible to derive 
conclusive proof before the identities of the perpetrators are established and 
confirmed by the investigators. Nevertheless, publicly available information 
derived from situational and circumstantial evidence could still provide useful 
clues. For instance, if the attackers threw grenades from a moving vehicle, then 
data records on ownership, movements, maintenance, and registration of that 
vehicle could provide guiding clues to the attackers’ identities. However, in most 
 36 
cases, vehicles used by terrorists and high-profile criminals are usually stolen 
from the registered owners, used to transport the attackers/criminals, and 
discarded immediately or even burnt to ashes after the attacks to destroy any 
evidence. 
Even though some suspects were apprehended a couple of days after the 
attack, no reliable information was obtained from them to provide any conclusive 
evidence on the actual perpetrators of the attack. Mokaya (2012, p. 1) noted that 
“Kenya’s anti-terror police unit arrested four suspects in connection with 
Saturday’s grenade attack in Nairobi.” Based on past operational experience of 
similar attacks by Al-Shabaab fighters in Mogadishu Somalia, in 2011, the author 
observes that it is neither easy nor common to identify terrorists who tactically 
assault selected targets using the hit and run technique. More so, for the Nairobi 
bus terminal attack, where the target itself could easily conceal the attackers 
because of congested human and vehicle traffic in and around the target. The 
attackers easily diffused into the traffic congestion, and made it difficult for police 
to identify and track them immediately after the attack. Such a scenario normally 
frustrates any effort to obtain credible evidence. Figure 14 shows Kenyan police 
and security operatives piecing together any possible pieces of evidence from 
one of the casualties of the attack.   
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Figure 14.  Kenyan Police and Security Officials Handling a Casualty 
(from AP, 2011). 
For this case study, the author was not able to derive the necessary 
empirical evidence to conclusively support a causal connection between the bus 
terminal attack and the research hypothesis. If the Kenyan police can produce an 
investigation report on this particular incident, then similar or related research in 
future may find credible and useful information and derive the anticipated 
empirical evidence to support a similar or related theory and hypothesis. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis explored the trends in transnational terrorism in East Africa, 
observing that it increased mainly in Kenya compared to other countries since 
2010, and it remains a potential threat to the security and stability of the entire 
region. The study utilized publicly available data since 1998 for Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, derived from the Global Terrorism Data Base. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that countries that contribute troops to the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are most vulnerable to retaliatory 
terrorist attacks from Al-Shabaab, the study found that Kenya experienced the 
highest level of terrorist violence. Nevertheless, Burundi, Uganda, and Ethiopia 
contributed more troops to AMISOM than Kenya, but they have encountered 
comparably fewer terrorist attacks since in the same period.  
A. CONCLUSION 
This study sought to explain this empirical puzzle through an investigation 
of the hypothesis that the heavy influx of Somali refugees was the key 
independent variable that drove Kenya to experience such a rapid increase in 
terrorist violence, relative to her neighbors. The evidence presented in this study 
lends substantial credence to this hypothesis. Case studies drawn from some of 
the largest attacks observed in Kenya during this period, at the Westgate 
shopping mall, Garissa churches, Eastleigh suburb, and the Nairobi bus terminal 
show that terrorist networks take advantage of refugee communities for 
recruitment, radicalization, and training of terrorists. Refugee camps in Kenya are 
used as safe havens for terrorists’ operations and planning, from where Al-
Shabaab operatives clandestinely reconnoiter and plot desired targets. These 
camps also provide terrorists proximity to targets and good targeting 
opportunities for high value and selected targets. It is also important to note that 
several other factors could have contributed to increased terrorist violence in 
Kenya; however, such factors could not be directly assessed in this study. These 
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factors include political repression, socio-economic disorder, competition for 
scarce resources, ignorance, poverty, ethnicity, sectarianism, and disharmony 
between Christians and Muslims. Further research will be needed in the future to 
consider such possibilities. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analysis presented in this study, the author makes the 
following recommendations for future policies: 
1. The Kenyan government should work closely with the United 
Nations Humanitarian Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 
minimize illegal immigration and uncontrollable influx of Somali 
refugees. 
2. Other East African countries are urged to derive lessons from 
Kenya’s situation to adopt and implement strategic initiatives for 
handling and management of refugee communities appropriately, to 
curtail and deter terrorist infiltration in refugee camps. 
3. The UNHCR should adopt a policy based on specific timelines by 
which repatriation of refugees back to their countries should be 
emphasized and prioritized depending on the security and political 
conditions in those countries. 
4. The Kenyan government should formulate policies and possibly 
enact new laws and legislation to fully integrate Somali-Kenyans 
into Kenyan society, to eradicate sectarianism, ethnic profiling, and 
discrepancy between Christians and Muslims. 
5. The East African Joint Counter-Terrorism Center (EAJCTC) based 
in Nairobi should be fully embraced and supported by all East 
African Community (EAC) member countries. Regional 
counterterrorism initiatives and strategies supported by 
international partners in the Global War on Terror should be 
strengthened and operationalized. 
6. Enhance regional collaboration and continuous capacity building 
amongst regional security and intelligence agencies, to facilitate 
information sharing and the development of technical capabilities to 
detect and thwart potential terrorist threats, while also coordinating 
joint and rapid responses to terrorist attacks. 
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